>>I AM DR. PARKER.
CHAIR OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE
BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY AND I
WOULD LIKE TO CALL THIS VIRTUAL
MEETING OF THE NSABB TO ORDER.
THANK YOU FOR BEING HERE TODAY.
I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN BY
WELCOMING OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
NSABB, OUR FEDERAL COLLEAGUES,
AND MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WHO
ARE JOINING US ON THIS WEBCAST
TODAY.
BEFORE I MAKE ADDITIONAL
REMARKS, I WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO
DR. TUCKER, THE DESIGNATED
FEDERAL OFFICIAL OF THE NSABB TO
REVIEW THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
POLICY AND PROVIDE HOUSEKEEPING
REMINDERS.
DR. TUCKER?
>> GOOD AFTERNOON, EVERYBODY.
GOOD TO SEE YOU.
AS A MEMBER OF THIS COMMITTEE,
YOU'RE A SPECIAL GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE AND THEREFORE SUBJECT
TO RULES OF CONDUCT THAT APPLY
TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
EXPLAINED IN THE REPORT TITLED,
STANDARDS OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR
EMPLOYEES OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH.
YOU EACH RECEIVED THE DOCUMENT
WHEN YOU WERE APPOINTED TO THE
COMMITTEE.
AT EVERY MEETING, IN ADDITION TO
REMINDING ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE
OF FOLLOWING ETHICS RULES, WE
REVIEW THE STEPS WE TAKE AND ASK
TO YOU TAKE, TO ENSURE THAT ANY
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ARE
ADDRESSED.
AS YOU KNOW, IT'S SCHEDULED
INTERVALS YOU PROVIDE US WITH
INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR PERSONAL,
PROFESSIONAL AND FINANCIAL
INTERESTS.
WE USE THIS INFORMATION AS A
BASIS FOR ASSESSING WHETHER YOU
HAVE ANY REAL OR POTENTIAL OR
APPARENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
THAT COULD COMPROMISE YOUR
ABILITY TO BE OBJECTIVE AND BIAS
DURING COMMITTEE MEETINGS.
WHILE WE WAIVE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST FOR GENERAL MATTERS
BECAUSE WE BELIEVE YOUR ABILITY
TO BE OBJECTIVE, WILL NOT BE
AFFECTED BY YOUR INTERESTS IN
SUCH MATTERS.
WE ALSO RELY TO A GREAT DEGREE
ON YOU TO BE ATTENTIVE DURING
OUR MEETINGS TO THE POSSIBILITY
THAT AN ISSUE COULD AFFECT OR
APPEAR TO AFFECT YOUR INTERESTS
IN A SPECIFIC WAY.
IF THIS HAPPENS, WE ASK YOU TO
RECUSE YOURSELF FROM THE
DISCUSSION AND LEAVE THE ZOOM
MEETING.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT
RULES OF CONDUCT, OR CONFLICT OF
INTEREST, OUR COMMITTEE
MANAGEMENT OFFICER, LISA, WILL
BE HAPPY TO ADDRESS THEM.
ADDITIONALLY, AS A REMINDER,
THIS PUBLIC MEETING IS BEING
VIDEOCAST BY -- I JUST GOT MY
NOTIFICATION OF RECORDING.
-- SO THIS MEETING IS BEING
RECORDED AND VIDEOCAST.
PLEASE KEEP YOUR MICROPHONES
MUTED WHEN NOT SPEAKING.
WE ASK YOU THAT PLEASE TURN YOUR
CAMERAS ON WHEN SPEAKING AND YOU
CAN FEEL FREE TO LEAVE YOUR
VIDEO ON OR OFF AT OTHER TIMES.
WE WILL BE USING THE HAND RAISE
FUNCTION IN ZOOM TO ASK
QUESTIONS OR MAKE ANY COMMENTS.
SO PLEASE USE THAT FUNCTION TO
INDICATE YOUR INTEREST IN
JOINING THE DISCUSSION.
DR. PARKER, I'LL TURN IT BACK TO
YOU.
>> DR. PARKER: THANK YOU VERY
MUCH.
AND FIRST I WANT TO SAY IT'S
NICE TO SEE COLLEAGUES THAT I
HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY I TO
WORK WITH OVER THE YEARS AND I'M
LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING NEW
COLLEAGUES AS WE BEGIN THIS
VENTURE.
I ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS
OPPORTUNITY TO RECOGNIZE SOME
NSABB MEMBERS WHO COMPLETED
THEIR TERMS OF SEVERANCE SINCE
THE BOARD LAST MET.
-- SERVICE -- THAT INCLUDES
DR. CRAIG CAMERON, NANCY, MARIE
LOUIS, JAME LaDUKE, MARGIE
LEE, STEVEN MORRIS, AND GENE
PATTERSON.
ALL PROVIDED IN EVENTUALLY
VALUABLE EXPERTISE AND
EXPERIENCE AND SERVICE TO THE
NSABB AND WE ALL OWE THEM A DEBT
OF GRATITUDE FOR THEIR SERVICE
TO THIS IMPORTANT COMMITTEE.
AND NOW I'D LIKE TO EXTEND A
WARM WELCOME TO THE NEW MEMBERS
OF THE BOARD.
Ms. SHANNON BENJAMIN,
DR. CHRISTINA EGAN,
DR. CARAMELLA HAINES,
Ms. RACHEL LEAVEN SON,
DR. ALEX LONDON, DR. SARAH,
DR. DENNIS METZGER, DR. ERIC
TOMLINSON, AND DR. NICHOLETTE.
THANK YOU ALL FOR AGREEING TO
LEND YOUR VALUABLE EXPERTISE AND
EXPERIENCE TO THE IMPORTANT WORK
OF THE NSABB.
I LOOK FORWARD TO AND HONORED TO
WORK WITH ALL OF YOU AS WE BEGIN
THIS JOURNEY AND JUST AS A HEADS
UP, I THINK WE COULD EXPECT TO
GET SOME FAIRLY AGGRESSIVE TIME
LINES AS WE BEGIN TO TAKE ON THE
WORK OF THIS NSABB COMMITTEE.
THE ROSTER FOR THE COMMITTEE, AS
WELL AS ADDITIONAL MEETING
MATERIALS CAN BE FOUND ON THE
NIH OFFICE OF POLICY WEBSITE.
OFFICE OF SCIENCE POLICY
WEBSITE.
AND BEFORE WE DIVE IN, I WANT TO
PROVIDE A QUICK OVERVIEW OF THE
COMMITTEE FOR THOSE ATTENDING
THE MEETING FOR THE FIRST TIME.
THE NSABB FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE CHARTERED TO PROVIDE
ADVICE, GUIDANCE AND
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
BIOSECURITY OVERSIGHT OF DUAL
USE RESEARCH.
THE MEMBERS PROVIDE EXPERT
PERSPECTIVES TO HELP ENSURE THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT
FRAMEWORK IS KEEPING UP WITH THE
RAPID ADVANCES IN SCIENCES THAT
MAY RAISE BIOSECURITY CONCERNS.
BIOSECURITY POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS ARE IMPORTANT
COMPONENT OF ONGOING EFFORTS TO
BOLSTER U.S. DEFENSE AND
PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS BY HELPING
TO ENSURE BIOSECURITY FRAMEWORK
FRAMEWORKS STRIKE THE RIGHT
BALANCE OF ALLOWING THE BENEFITS
OF VIABLE RESEARCH TO CONTINUE
AT A RAPID PACE WHILE MANAGING
THE BIOSECURITY RISK.
THE BOARD HAS LONG BEEN A LEADER
IN DISCUSSIONS REGARDING
BIOSECURITY AND DUAL USE
RESEARCH CONCERNS.
AND THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS
HAVE A KEY INPUT IN DEVELOPMENT
OF CURRENT POLICIES AND WE'LL BE
DISCUSSING THOSE TODAY.
AT THE LAST MEETING IN JANUARY
2020, THE COMMITTEE WAS CHARGED
WITH PROVIDING RECOMMENDATIONS
ON BALANCE OF SECURITY AND
PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY WITH WHEN
SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT
RESEARCH WITH ENHANCED POTENTIAL
PATHOGENS.
THE BOARD WAS ALSO TASKED WITH
EVALUATING ANALYZING U.S. DUAL
USE RESEARCH CONCERN POLICIES.
AS YOU KNOW, THIS IS THE FIRST
MEETING OF THE BOARD SINCE
ACTIVITIES WERE NECESSARILY
PAUSED DUE TO RAPID ESCALATION
OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC TO ALLOW
MEMBERS ON TO PRIORITIZE
COVID-19 RESEARCH, RESPONSE
ACTIVITIES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
DUTIES AT LOCAL STATE, NATIONAL
LEVELS AND THEIR UNIVERSITIES.
DR. TABAK AND DR. JURGENSEN WILL
BE PRESENTING AN AMENDED CHARGE
AND THEN THERE WILL BE
DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS.
ADDITIONALLY, THANK YOU TO THOSE
WHO PROVIDED WRITTEN COMMENTS.
THESE WRITTEN COMMENTS WERE
POSTED TO THE NIH OFFICE OF
SCIENCE AND POLICY WEBSITE PRIOR
TO THE MEETING AND SHARED WITH
THE COMMITTEE.
WE WILL NOW BE HEARING FROM
DR. ANDREW PEBLER AND DR. DANIEL
OF A BROADER U.S. GOVERNMENT
PERSPECTIVES.
DR. HEPLER IS ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
AT THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY.
AND THE DIRECTOR FOR BIODEFENSE
AND PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AT THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
WE WILL THEN HEAR FROM DR. LARRY
TABAK, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE
NIH AND DR. JURGENSEN, THE
ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR
SCIENCE POLICY AT THE NIH ABOUT
THE CHARGE TO THE NSABB.
FOLLOWING THAT, WE WILL MOVE TO
DISCUSSION AND NEXT STEPS FOR
THE COMMITTEE.
DR. HEBLER, I WILL TURN IT OVER
TO YOU.
>> DR. HEBLER: THANK YOU VERY
MUCH, DR. PARKER.
CAN YOU HEAR ME?
>> YES, SIR.
>> GREAT.
I WILL TRY TO PROJECT SOME
SLIDES HERE.
DO THE IMPOSSIBLE.
WALK AND CHEW GUM AT THE SAME
TIME.
I WANT TO THANK YOU ALL FOR
OPENING AND THANK YOU ALL FOR
BEING HERE TODAY.
WE REALLY APPRECIATE THE VITAL
SERVICE THAT ALL OF YOU PROVIDE
THROUGH THE NATIONAL SCIENCE
ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY
AND WE ARE PARTICULARLY EXCITED
TO RECONVENE THE NSABB AND
CONTINUE THE NSABB'S -- WHAT WE
KNOW WILL BE IMPORTANT
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS AREA.
WHENEVER WE THINK ABOUT THE
ISSUES, I THINK IT'S BEST TO
ALWAYS BEGIN AT THE BEGINNING
AND JUST ACKNOWLEDGE THE
EXTRAORDINARY BENEFITS THAT LIFE
SCIENCES RESEARCH PROVIDES.
OBVIOUSLY LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH
UNDERPINS BIOMEDICAL AND PUBLIC
HEALTH ADVANCES OF WHICH WE HAVE
BEEN THE BENEFICIARY THROUGH THE
PRODUCTS PRODUCED TO HELP
CONTROL THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
BUT LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH ALSO
PROVIDES BENEFITS FAR BEYOND
HEALTH AND MEDICINE TO OTHER
SECTORS INCLUDING AGRICULTURE,
IMPROVING THE SAFETY AND QUALITY
OF THE FOOD SUPPLY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND VITAL
FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY.
HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT
CERTAIN KINDS OF LIFE SCIENCES
RESEARCH CAN BE INHERENTLY RISKY
GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR
BIOSAFETY LAPSES OR DELIBERATE
MISUSE AND RECENT OUTBREAKS NOT
JUST COVID-19 PANDEMIC, BUT ALSO
RECENTLY THE EBOLA OUTBREAK IN
WEST AFRICA, ZIKA AND A RANGE OF
OTHER INFECTIOUS DISEASES HAVE
JUST UNDERSCORED HOW INFECTIOUS
DISEASES HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR
REALLY SUBSTANTIAL SOCIETAL
DISRUPTION.
I ALSO WANTED TO TAKE A MOMENT
HERE AT THE TOP AND JUST
HIGHLIGHT TWO OF THE SORT OF
CORE TERMS THAT ARE GOING TO
GUIDE A LOT OF YOUR DELIBERATION
OR THEY WILL BE CENTERED AROUND.
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ADOPTED TWO
IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS TO GUIDE
THINKING ABOUT THESE KINDS OF
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH LIFE
SCIENCES RESEARCH.
THESE INCLUDE DUAL USE RESEARCH
OF CONCERN AND PANDEMIC
POTENTIAL PATHOGENS.
VERY IMPORTANTLY, THESE
DEFINITIONS HAVE BEEN REALLY
PRECISELY SCOPED AND FORMED IN
LARGE PART BY EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS
THAT YOU, THE NSABB, PERFORMED
AND INDICT LOG WITH THE BROADER
LIFE SCIENCES COMMUNITY.
A VERY SPECIALIZED SUBSET OF
LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH THAT HAS
THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR
GENERATING INFORMATION THAT
COULD BE READILY MISUSED TO
THREATEN PUBLIC HEALTH AND
NATIONAL SECURITY.
YOU WILL HEAR MORE ABOUT SOME OF
THE DETAILS OF OUR FRAMEWORKS
WHEN YOU -- WHEN WE YIELD THE
FLOOR TO DR. TABAK BUT YOU'LL
SEE THAT DURC CAN INCLUDE
RESEARCH THAT INVOLVES ONE OF 15
DEFINED PATHOGENS OR TOXINS AND
SEVEN CATEGORIES OF EXPERIMENTS.
PANDEMIC POTENTIAL PATHOGENS
REFERS TO PATHOGENS THAT ARE
BOTH LIKELY HIGHLY TRANSMISCIBLE
AND CAPABLE OF WIDE AND
UNCONTROLLABLE SPREAD AMONG
HUMANS AND TWO, LIKELY HIGHLY
VIRCOMMENT LIKELY TO CAUSE
SIGNIFICANT MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY IN HUMANS.
ENHANCED PANDEMIC POTENTIAL
PATHOGEN IS PPP, THAT RESULTS
FROM THE ENHANCEMENTS OF THE
TRANSMIGSABILITY AND/OR
VIRULENCE OF A PATHOGEN.
OVER THE LAST DECADE, THE POLICY
FRAMEWORKS GOVERNING DURC AND
PANDEMIC PATHOGEN -- PANDEMIC
POTENTIAL PATHOGEN OVERSIGHT --
I STILL STUMBLE OVER THAT
PHRASE.
I'LL GET IT EVENTUALLY.
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS
GOVERNOR BY A POLICY THAT HAS
GROWN TO INCLUDE THESE FOUR
POLICIES OUTLINED ON THIS SLIDE.
TWO OF WHICH ARE FOCUSED ON DURC
WHICH ARE FOCUSED ON P3CO.
THE PRIOR NAME OF THE DURC
POLICIES IS TO PRESERVE THE LIFE
SCIENCES AND MINIMIZE RISKS THAT
THE TECHNOLOGIES PRODUCED COULD
BE MISAPPLIED TO CAUSE
SIGNIFICANT HARM.
TOGETHER THESE TWO DURC POLICIES
PROMOTE A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH
BETWEEN FEDERAL FUNDERS AND
RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS TO
IDENTIFY DURC AND MANAGE ANY
ASSOCIATED RISKS THROUGHOUT THE
RESEARCH CONTINUUM FROM PROJECT
CONCEPTION TO PUBLICATION AND
RESULTS AND FINDINGS.
IT WAS FOLLOWING THE SERIES OF
LABORATORY INCIDENTS AT USG
FACILITIES IN 2014 AND THE
SUBSEQUENT PAUSE ON CERTAIN
KINDS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING
PANDEMIC POTENTIAL PATHOGENS AT
MY OFFICE AT THE WHITE HOUSE,
INITIATED A PROCESS TO EVALUATE
THE RISKS AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS
OF THIS RESEARCH.
AND IT WAS FROM THOSE
DELIBERATIONS INCLUDING
DELIBERATIONS MADE BY THE NSABB
THAT THE P3C0 FRAMEWORKS SORT OF
GREW OUT OR WERE DEVELOPED.
THE P3CO POLICY WHILE DIFFERING
IN SCOPE ASK COMPLEMENTARY TO
MITIGATE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH
CERTAIN SUBSET OF LIFE SCIENCES
RESEARCH THAT HAS BEEN ASSESSED
AS POSING POTENTIAL RISKS THAT
WARRANT ADDITIONAL REVIEW OR
OVERSIGHT.
AND THE RESEARCH SUBJECT TO
THESE POLICIES IS CONDUCTED
UNDER RIGOROUS BIOSAFETY AND
BIOSECURITY CONDITIONS AND
OVERSIGHT AND WITH APPROPRIATE
RISK MITIGATION MEASURES IN
FLIES HELP US REALIZE THE
BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH TO
PUBLIC HEALTH, AGRICULTURE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY.
AND SO, AS YOU EMBARK ON THESE
IMPORTANT DELIBERATIONS AND
ANALYSIS, AND OF COURSE
DR. TABAK WILL ISSUE YOUR
SPECIFIC CHARGE MOMENTARILY, WE
HOPE TO THAT WILL BE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER A RANGE
OF OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
INCLUDING WHETHER THE DURC
POLICIES HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE --
EFFECTIVE INCLUDING RELATED TO
EXPERIMENTATION TYPE
PUBLICATION, PUBLIC
COMMUNICATION, AND DISSEMINATION
OF DUAL USE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
AND RESULTS AS WELL AS OVERALL
IMPACT ON RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS.
THIS WILL ALSO BE AN OPPORTUNITY
TO RE-EVALUATE THE DURC
DEFINITION ITSELF CONSIDERING
POTENTIAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, RAPID
ADVANCES IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
AND OF COURSE THE CONVERGENCE OF
LIFE SCIENCES WITH OTHER
DISCIPLINES.
AND ALSO TO REALLY ASK, WHAT IS
THE RELATIVE VALUE OF DIFFERENT
TYPES OF EXPERIMENTS AND ARE
THERE SOME TYPES OF EXPERIMENTS
THAT MAY BE TOO RISKY AND/OR NOT
NEEDED TO BE DONE?
AND SO WITH THAT, I JUST WANT TO
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR
SERVICE.
WE ARE REALLY EAGER TO HEAR YOUR
VIEWS AND I'D LIKE TO TURN THE
FLOOR TO MY COLLEAGUE, DANIELLE
FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL FOR HIS PERSPECTIVE ON
THESE IMPORTANT DELIBERATIONS.
>> THANK YOU.
CAN YOU HEAR ME?
>> YES.
>> STILL TWEAKING THIS TWO YEARS
INTO THIS PANDEMIC.
THANK YOU, ANDREW AND THANK YOU
EVERYONE FOR BEING HERE.
I AM JUST GOING TO SPEND ONE
MINUTE EMPHASIZING THE
IMPORTANCE WE PLACE ON THIS
WORK.
WE BELIEVE THAT NOW IS A
CRITICAL TIME FOR THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT TO EVALUATE OUR
POLICIES ON BIOSAFETY,
BIOSECURITY AND LIFE SCIENCES
DUAL USE RESEARCH.
THE COVID PANDEMIC DEMONSTRATED
THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF
THE GLOBAL BIOLOGICAL EVENT AND
IT IS A TOP PRIORITY OF THIS
ADMINISTRATION TO PREVENT,
DETECT, PREPARE FOR AND RESPOND
TO BIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS.
ON THE FIRST DAY IN OFFICE, THE
PRESIDENT TASKED THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT REVIEW OF
ACTIONS TO MITIGATE EMERGING,
DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL BIOLOGICAL
RISKS.
CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THIS WORK
IS ENSURING WE HAVE RIGOROUS
POLICIES IN PLACE TO ENSURE
NATIONAL AND GLOBAL BIOSAFETY
AND BIOSECURITY INCLUDING DUAL
USE LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH AND
TO ADDRESS CRITICAL RISKS
ASSOCIATED WITH ADVANCES IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY.
WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES ACROSS THE GOVERNMENT,
WE ARE CURRENTLY REVIEWING OUR
POLICIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS
ON THESE ISSUES WHICH WILL BE
IMFORMED BY INPUT FROM EXTERNAL
STAKEHOLDERS, INCLUDING THE
NSABB.
PART OF THIS EFFORT WE ARE
ADDRESSING CHALLENGING QUESTIONS
INCLUDING BOTH REDUCING THE RISK
AND ENSURING POSITIVE BENEFITS
FROM LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH.
INCLUDING THE RELATIVE VALUE OF
DIFFERENT TYPES OF EXPERIMENTS
FOR ACHIEVING SPECIFIC HEALTH
OBJECTIVES AND WHETHER THERE ARE
SOME EXPERIMENTS THAT SHOULD NOT
BE DONE BECAUSE OF THE RISKS
THEY POSE.
SULTRY, WE ARE ALSO WORKING TO
PROMOTE BIOSECURITY AND
BIOSAFETY INNOVATIONS AND
TECHNOLOGIES AS PART OF OUR
BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT SO WE
HAVE A MORE INTEGRATED APPROACH
TO THESE ISSUES.
WE ALL SEEN ENORMOUS BENEFITS
BROUGHT BY LIFE SCIENCES
RESEARCH AND THE COUNTLESS LIVES
THIS RESEARCH HAS SAVED DURING
OF THE COURSE OF THE COVID
PANDEMIC.
WE ALSO HAVE TO FACE THE
INCREASING RISKS THAT DUAL USE
AND ENHANCED POTENTIAL PANDEMIC
PATHOGEN RESEARCH CAN POSE IF
MISUSED.
WITH THAT SAID, I WANT TO THANK
YOU ALL FOR THE TIME YOU ARE
DEVOTING TO THOSE IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS AND WITH THAT, LET ME
PASS IT BACK.
>> VERY GOOD.
THANK YOU BOTH OF YOU.
IT'S INCREDIBLY IMPORTANT THAT
WE HEAR FROM BOTH -- THAT WE
HEARD FROM BOTH LEADERSHIPS
ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS
WORK THAT WE ARE GOING TO BE
UNDERTAKING TO REALLY TRY TO
FIND THAT RIGHT BALANCE OF
ENHANCING THE ABILITY OF THE
LIFE SCIENCES TO CONTINUE TO
MAKE RAPID AS ADVANCEMENTS BUT
ALSO MINIMIZING ANY POTENTIAL
RISKS THAT COMES WITH THAT.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR
COMMENTS.
AND IT HELPS US KNOWING THAT
THIS IS SUCH OF IMPORTANCE AT
THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF OUR
GOVERNMENT.
THANK YOU.
I ALSO THANK THE NEW MEMBERS OF
THE BOARD.
I THINK YOU CAN TELL THAT THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS BOARD IN
YOUR VIEWS AND EXPERIENCE AND
EXPERTISE, HAVE BEEN HEARD IN
THE PAST AND THEY WILL BE HEARD
THIS TIME TOO.
BECAUSE THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PAST HAVE LED DIRECTLY INTO
AND FED AND HELPED SHAPE BOTH
THE DURC AND THE P3CO POLICIES.
WE HAVE IMPORTANT WORK WE WILL
BE UNDERTAKING.
NOW IT'S MY HONOR TO INTRODUCE
THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE NIH,
DR. LAWRENCE TABAK AND THE
ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR
SCIENCE POLICY AT THE NIH,
DR. JURGENSEN, WHO WILL REVIEW
THE CHARGE TO THE NSABB.
DR. TABAK.
>> THANK YOU DR. PARKER.
AND THANK YOU TO ALL MEMBERS OF
THE COMMITTEE AND TO THOSE OF
YOU WHO ARE WATCHING THE WEBCAST
WEBCAST.
I'M LARRY TABAK, ACTING DIRECTOR
OF NIH, AND AS NOTED, I'M JOINED
BY DR. JURGENSEN, THE NIH ACTING
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE
POLICY.
AS DR. HEBLER NOTED, IT'S OUR
PLEASURE TO BE HERE TODAY TO
CONTINUE TO ENGAGE NSABB MEMBERS
ON HIGH-PRIORITY BIOSECURITY
ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
NOW I RECOGNIZE THAT IT HAS BEEN
TWO YEARS SINCE THE COMMITTEE
LAST MET.
AS WE NECESSARILY PAUSED THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE GROUP DUE TO
THE RAPID ESCALATION AND THE
SEVERITY OF THE COVID-19 PUBLIC
HEALTH CRISIS.
NO DOUBT YOU ARE ALL DEEPLY
ENGAGED AT YOUR OWN INSTITUTIONS
THROUGH THIS TIME PERIOD.
AND WE CERTAINLY APPRECIATE ALL
THAT THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY HAS
DONE TO WORK TOGETHER AND
COMBATING THIS DEVASTATING
GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS.
I ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL WORK
WITH ALL MEMBERS TO MAKE CERTAIN
THAT YOU'RE ALL UP TO SPEED AND
WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH ALL OF
THE SUPPORT NEEDED AS YOU BEGIN
TO UNDERTAKE THIS IMPORTANT
WORK.
MAY I HAVE THE NEXT SLIDE,
PLEASE.
NOW, AS YOU HAVE HEARD, NIH, HHS
AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REMAIN
COMMITTED TO ENSURING THAT
RESEARCH WITH INFECTIOUS AGENTS
IS CONDUCTED RESPONSIBLY IN A
MANNER THAT CONSIDERS THE
POTENTIAL BIOSECURITY AND SAFETY
RISKS.
THE U.S. HAS A COMPREHENSIVE
BIOSECURITY AND BIOSAFETY
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE, WHICH IS
MADE UP OF COMPLEMENTARY
GUIDELINES, POLICIES AND
REGULATIONS THAT ARE GROUNDED IN
THE IDENTIFICATION AND
ASSESSMENT OF BOTH RISKS AND
BENEFITS AND EFFECTIVE
MITIGATION OF RISKS.
SOME OF THE SAME RESEARCH THAT
HAS SPECIFIC BIOSECURITY
CONCERNS IS ALSO ESSENTIAL FOR
PROTECTING GLOBAL HEALTH.
SO A KEY CHALLENGE IS, HOW TO
ENABLE RESEARCH WITH POTENTIALLY
SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS TO HUMAN
HEALTH WHILE ENSURING THAT
SAFETY AND SECURITY RISKS ARE
IDENTIFIED AND APPROPRIATELY
MANAGED?
AS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGIES
ADVANCE, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
REGULARLY REVIEWS AND AS NEEDED,
UPDATES ARE OVERSIGHT SYSTEM TO
HELP IDENTIFY NOVEL RISKS ENSURE
EFFECTIVE RISK MITIGATION AND
ENSURE THAT OUR PROCEDURES AND
APPLIED MITIGATION MEASURES ARE
GROUNDED IN THOUGHTFUL RISK
ASSESSMENTS THAT CONSIDER THE
CURRENT STATE OF THE SCIENCE.
BY FACILITATING BROAD PUBLIC
DISCUSSION AND EXPERT INPUT TO
HELP INFORM UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT POLICY ACTIVITY, THE
NSABB PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN
THIS PROCESS AND WE CERTAINLY
LOOK FORWARD TO THE BOARD'S
CONTINUED ADVICE AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON OUR
BIOSECURITY OVERSIGHT
FRAMEWORKS.
YOU ALL MET LAST IN EARLY 2020
TO CONSIDER HOW BIOSECURITY
POLICY CAN APPROPRIATELY BALANCE
SECURITY AND TRANSPARENCY WHEN
SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT
RESEARCH INVOLVING ENHANCED
POTENTIAL PANDEMIC PATHOGENS.
THE CHARGE ALSO INCLUDED A
REVIEW OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
POLICIES ON DUAL USE RESEARCH OF
CONCERN.
WORKING WITH OUR U.S. GOVERNMENT
PARTNERS, WE'D LIKE TO EXPAND
THAT CHARGE TODAY TO ENABLE A
BROADER REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF
THE SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
TWO MAJOR U.S. BIOSECURITY
POLICY FRAMEWORKS, WHICH GOVERN
RESEARCH WITH ENHANCED POTENTIAL
PANDEMIC PATHOGENS, AND DUAL USE
RESEARCH OF CONCERN.
IF I COULD HAVE THE NEXT SLIDE,
PLEASE.
DR. HEBLER COVERED SOME OF THIS
AND I WOULD LIKE TO AMPLIFY
SEVERAL POINTS.
THERE ARE SEVERAL USGHHS
POLICIES COVERING DUAL USE
RESEARCH OF CONCERN, OR DURC,
AND RESEARCH INVOLVING ENHANCED
POTENTIAL PATHOGENIC PATHOGENS,
OR EPPPs, INCLUDING THE
FEDERAL DURC POLICY, THE
INSTITUTIONAL DURC POLICY, THE
OSTP POLICY GUIDANCE INVOLVING
EPPPs AND THE HHS FRAMEWORK
IMPLEMENTING THAT GUIDANCE.
THE DEFINITIONS OF THESE POLICY
FRAMEWORKS HAVE BEEN PRECISELY
SCOPED AND FORMED BY YOUR
EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS.
BEFORE I MOVE INTO OUR ASK OF
ALL OF YOU, I'LL JUST SAY A
COUPLE OF WORDS ABOUT THESE
POLICIES AND THE RESEARCH THAT
COVER THEM.
RESEARCH INVOLVING AGENTS TO
OBJECT THIS OVERSIGHT HELPS US
UNDERSTAND THE FUNDAMENTAL
NATURE OF HUMAN PATHOGEN
INTERACTIONS, ASSESS THE
PANDEMIC POTENTIAL OF EMERGING
INFECTIOUS AGENTS SUCH AS
VIRUSES, AND INFORM PUBLIC
HEALTH AND PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS
INCLUDING SURVEILLANCE AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF VACCINES AND
OTHER MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES.
THE PRIMARY AIM OF THE DURC
POLICIES IS TO PRESERVE THE
BENEFITS OF LIFE SCIENCES, DURC,
WHILE MINIMIZING RISK THAT THE
KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION PRODUCTS
OR TECHNOLOGIES PRODUCED COULD
BE MISAPPLIED TO CAUSE
SIGNIFICANT HARM.
TOGETHER, THE DURC POLICIES
PROMOTE A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH
BETWEEN FEDERAL FUNDERS AND
RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS TO
IDENTIFY DURC AND MANAGE ANY
ASSOCIATED RISKS THROUGHOUT THE
RESEARCH CONTINUUM FROM PROJECT
CONCEPTION TO ULTIMATELY
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS AND
FINDINGS.
ADDITIONALLY, U.S.
GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED EPPP
RESEARCH REQUIRES STRICT
EVERYSIGHT AND MAY ONLY BE
CONDUCTED WITH --
OVERSIGHT - PROPER BIOSAFETY AND
BIOSECURITY MEASURES REQUIRED IN
PART BY THE POTENTIAL PANDEMIC
PATHOGEN CARE AND OVERSIGHT, OR
THE P3CO FRAMEWORK.
THE P3CO POLICY IS COMPLEMENTARY
IN ITS AIM TO MITIGATE RISKS
ASSOCIATED WITH A CERTAIN SUBSET
OF LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH THAT
HAS BEEN ASSESSED AS POSING
POTENTIAL RISKS THAT WARRANT
ADDITIONAL REVIEW AND/OR
OVERSIGHT.
THE RESEARCH SUBJECT TO THESE
POLICIES IS CONDUCTED UNDER
RIGOROUS BIOSAFETY AND
BIOSECURITY CONDITIONS AND
OVERSIGHT AND WITH APPROPRIATE
RISK MITIGATION MEASURES IN
PLACE, TO HELP US REALIZE THE
BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH THROUGH
PUBLIC HEALTH, AGRICULTURE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY.
IF I MAY HAVE THE NEXT SLIDE,
PLEASE.
SO TO BEGIN WITH THE NSABB
CHARGE, THE FIRST PHASE 1, THE
P3CO POLICYEE VIEW AND
EVALUATION.
IT'S ALWAYS PRUDE TONIGHT
PERIODICALLY ASSESS THE EFFICACY
OF OUR POLICIES AND GIVEN THE
IMPORTANCE OF BIOSECURITY
ISSUES, NIH AND THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT CONTINUALLY SEEK WAYS
TO STRIKE THE RIGHT BALANCE OF
MAXIMIZING BENEFITS WHILE
MITIGATING POTENTIAL RISKS.
THUS, WHILE WORKING WITH OUR
U.S. GOVERNMENT PARTNERS, WE
HAVE EXPANDED OUR ASK OF THE
NSABB FROM THE 2020 TIME PERIOD
TO ENABLE A BROADER REVIEW AND
EVALUATION OF BOTH THE DURC AND
P3CO POLICIES.
THIS TIMING IS PARTICULARLY
GERMANE GIVEN IT'S BEEN FIVE
YEARS AFTER THE RELEASE OF THE
P3CO POLICY AND 10 YEARS AFTER
THE RELEASE OF THE FEDERAL DURC
POLICY.
THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE
OCCURRING WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF
BROADER EFFORTS TO BOLSTER OUR
READINESS FOR AND CAPABILITY TO
ADDRESS FUTURE THREATS SUCH AS
THOSE THAT WE FACE TODAY WITH
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.
ACCORDINGLY, THE CHARGE TO THE
NSABB DIVIDED INTO TWO PHASES.
PHASE I OF THE CHARGE IS
CENTERED ON AN EVALUATION OF THE
P3CO POLICY.
WE ASK THE NSABB TO EVALUATE AND
PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE
EFFECTIVE THINKS OF THE CURRENT
OVERSIGHT FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH
INVOLVING ENHANCED PPPs,
INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF THE
OSTP POLICY GUIDANCE AND THE
PROCESS ADOPTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES FOR THE REVIEW AND
OVERSIGHT OF PROPOSED RESEARCH
INVOLVING EPPPs.
THIS TASK REFLECTS AN EXPANSION
FROM THE 2020 CHARGE IN THAT THE
REVIEW SHOULD EXAMINE, FIRST,
POLICY SCOPE IN TERMS OF
PRESERVING BENEFITS OF EPPP
RESEARCH WHILE MINIMIZING
POTENTIAL BIOSAFETY AND
BIOSECURITY RISKS, INCLUDING
WHETHER WILDTYPE PATHOGENS,
ANIMAL MODELS OF
TRANSMISSIBILITY, ET CETERA,
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.
TWO, CONSIDERATIONS FOR
SUPPORTING EPPP RESEARCH
INTERNATIONALLY AND THIRD,
BALANCING SECURITY AND PUBLIC
TRANSPARENCY CONSIDERATIONS WHEN
SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT EPPP
RESEARCH.
THE REVIEW SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER
THE IMPACT THAT THE POLICY
GUIDANCE HAS HAD ON WORK
INVOLVING THE CREATION, TRANSFER
OR USE OF EPPPs RESEARCH
PROGRAMS AND INSTITUTIONS WHEN
DEVELOPING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS.
PREVIOUSLY, THIS PORTION OF THE
CHARGE WAS FOCUSED ON BALANCING
SECURITY AND PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY
CONSIDERATIONS WHEN SHARING
INFORMATION ABOUT EPPP RESEARCH.
THE REVIEW OF THE POLICY SCOPE,
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORTING
EPPP RESEARCH INTERNATIONALLY
AND IMPACT HAVE BEEN ADDED TO
ENSURE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEW.
IF I MAY HAVE THE NEXT SLIDE,
PLEASE.
PHASE II OF THE NSABB CHARGE,
WHICH IS THE CHANGE FROM THE
2020 CHARGE, MAY BE CONSIDERED
AS HAVING TWO COMPONENTS.
FIRST, IN PHASE II A, WE ASK THE
NSABB TO ANALYZE AND EVALUATE
THE 2012 AND 2014 U.S.
GOVERNMENT FEDERAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL POLICIES FOR THE
OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES,
DURC, AND TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS TO INFORM FUTURE
U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY REVIEWS
UNDERTAKEN BY OSTP AND NSC.
SPECIFICALLY, THE NSABB IS ASKED
TO FIRST, EVALUATE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DURC
POLICIES IN ACHIEVING THEIR
INTENT.
SECOND, EVALUATE THE IMPACT ON
RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS AND THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO
SUPPORT RESEARCH; THIRD,
IDENTIFY ANY CHALLENGES WITH THE
IMPLEMENTATION; FINALLY TO
EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
DURC POLICIES REGARDING
PUBLICATION, PUBLIC
COMMUNICATION AND DISSEMINATION
OF DUAL-USE RESEARCH
METHODOLOGIES AND RESULTS.
NEXT, PLEASE.
WITH REGARD TO THE SCOPE OF THE
DURC POLICIES, THE NSABB SHOULD
ALSO RE-EVALUATE THE DURC
DEFINITION WHICH IS SHOWN ON
THIS SLIDE HIGHLIGHTED IN
YELLOW.
CONSIDERING THE ADVANCES AND
LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH AND
CONVERGENCE WITH OTHER
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES AND
SECTORS, AND EVALUATE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF DURC PATHOGEN
LIST AND EXPERIMENT TYPE
CONSTRUCT TO DETERMINE IF THE
APPROACH SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESSES
FUTURE POTENTIAL RISKS,
INCLUDING ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF
LIFE SCIENCES S CONDUCIVE TO
RESEARCH RISK-MITIGATION AND
WHETHER ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
ARE WARRANTED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.
IF I MAY HAVE THE NEXT SLIDE,
PLEASE.
THE SECOND COMPONENT OF PHASE II
OF THE NSABB CHARGE, FOCUSES ON
THE 2017OSTP-P3CO POLICY
GUIDANCE, SPECIFICALLY SECTION 8
ENTITLED, FUTURE COMMITMENTS,
AND THE NSABB SHOULD PROVIDE
RECOMMENDATIONS ON POSSIBLE P3CO
POLICY GUIDANCE INCORPORATION
INTO THE POLICY FRAMEWORKS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE RECOMMENDED
REVISIONS OF THE DURC POLICIES.
THROUGHOUT PHASE II, THE NSABB
IS ASKED TO CONSIDER THE NEED
FOR FLEXIBLE AND ADAPTIVE
GOVERNANCE APPROACHES THAT WILL
KEEP PACE WITH SCIENTIFIC
ADVANCES AND ARE EVER EVOLVING
UNDERSTANDING OF RISKS AND
BENEFITS THAT CAN COALESCE AND
INTEGRATE EXISTING GOVERNMENT
GUIDANCE, OR POLICY, AND CAN BE
APPLIED TO MITIGATE RISKS NOT
ONLY FROM RESEARCH OF CONCERN
BUT OTHER BIOSECURITY AND
BIOSAFETY CONSIDERATIONS.
I'D NOW LIKE TO TURN TO
DR. JURGENSEN TO ADDRESS THE
ANTICIPATED TIMELINE FOR THE
NSABB'S WORK.
>> THANK YOU VERY MUCH, LARRY.
AND THANK YOU TO MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE FOR THEIR SERVICE
TODAY AND FOR BEING WILLING TO
BE GONE YET ANOTHER IMPORTANCE
FOR THE RESEARCH ENTERPRISE AND
FOR THE GREATER PUBLIC.
SO WE ANTICIPATE THE BOARD'S
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
WILL ULTIMATELY HELP INFORM
FUTURE U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
TO REVIEW AND AS NEEDED, UPDATE
OUR BIOSECURITY OVERSIGHT
FRAMEWORKS.
AND YOU HEARD THIS ALL FROM OUR
PREVIOUS SPEAKERS ABOUT HOW
THESE ARE ALL INTERSECTING
EFFORTS.
WE ALSO EXPECT THAT GIVEN THE
IMPORTANCE OF THIS TOPIC, WE
WILL ASK YOU TO WORK ON A
SLIGHTLY EXPEDITED TIMELINE
ULTIMATELY WITH HOPES OF
WRAPPING UP BY THE END OF THIS
CALENDAR YEAR.
YOU CAN SEE LAID OUT IN THIS
FLOWCHART BELOW.
WE ALSO EXPECT THAT YOU'LL NEED
TO FORM WORKING GROUPS TO
ADDRESS EACH PHASE OF THE CHARGE
AND THIS IS PROPOSED ON THE
TIMELINE FOR CONSIDERATION AND
FURTHER DISCUSSION HERE TODAY.
OVER THE COMING MONTHS, WE AS AN
AGENCY, PLAN TO WORK WITH OTHER
USG PARTNERS AND YOU TO ENGAGE
THE CLICK SMEs IN THIS
CONVERSATION AND HOLD LISTENING
SESSIONS AND HEAR FROM RELEVANT
STAKEHOLDERS, RESEARCHERS,
INSTITUTIONS AND FEDERAL FUNDING
AGENCIES THAT HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN
ON THE GROUND IMPLEMENTING THESE
POLICIES AS WELL AS HEAR FROM
OUR PUBLIC IN TERMS OF THEIR
PERSPECTIVES TO HELP INFORM
DELIBERATIONS.
OF COURSE OUR ULTIMATE AIM IS TO
UNDERTAKE A DELIBERATE AND
TRANSPARENT PROCESS WHICH THE
NSAB KNOWS HOW TO DO QUITE WELL.
IN TERMS OF REVIEWING SCOPE AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT BIOSECURITIESY POLICY
FRAMEWORKS.
AS MENTIONED BY OUR WHITE HOUSE
COLLEAGUES, THIS OVERSIGHT OF
RESEARCH IS OFTEN CONSIDERED
VITAL TO PUBLIC HEALTH, NATIONAL
SECURITY AND PANDEMIC
PREPAREDNESS SO IT IS ESSENTIAL
THAT ANY CONSIDERATIONS BE
MEASURED THE RISK.
WE RECOGNIZE THIS WILL BE A LIFT
ON COMPETING WITH OTHER DEMANDS
BUT WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR
EXPERTISE ON THESE IMPORTANT
ISSUES.
I THINK WE'D LIKE TO TOURN
DISCUSSION OF THIS TIMELINE AND
THE EXPECTED NEXT STEPS.
THE SO I WILL TURN THE
PROCEEDINGS BACK OVER TO DR.S
PARKER AND TUCKER FOR MEMBER
DISCUSSION REGARDING CHARGE AND
TASK.
>> I WANT TO THANK DR. TABAK AND
DR. JURGENSEN.
I THINK YOU ARE REALLY ASKING
THE RIGHT QUESTIONS FOR THE
NSABB TO START UNPACKING AND
PROVIDE ADVICE THAT WILL BE
NEEDED BY THE NIH AND THE OSTP.
SO THESE ARE BIG QUESTIONS.
AND IT'S ALSO AN AGGRESSIVE
TIMELINE FOR THESE BIG
QUESTIONS.
NONETHELESS, THE NSABB HAS GOT
INCREDIBLE BREATH OF EXPERIENCE
AND EXPERTISE THAT IS ON THE
BOARD NOW.
AND I THINK A LOT OF THAT
EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE CAN BE
BROUGHT TO BEAR FAIRLY QUICKLY.
SO I'M PRETTY CONFIDENT ABOUT
THE TIMELINE.
I KNOW IT'S AGGRESSIVE BUT WITH
OUR EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE AND
COMMITMENT TO BOTH BIODEFENSE,
PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AND BEING
ABLE TO DO THIS IN A WHAT I IS
SAFE AND SECURE AND RESPONSIBLE
SCIENCE AND ALSO ADDRESSING
INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS, I KNOW
THE BOARD MEMBERS ARE COMMITTED
TO DOING THAT AND BRINGING OUR
EXPERTISE TO BEAR ON THAT.
SO, GIVEN THE TWO MAJOR THRUSTS
WHICH ARE BOTH PRETTY BIG
THRUSTS, WE HAVE GOT TO BEGIN
WORK NOW LIKE IMMEDIATELY.
AND I SEE THAT WE NEED TO SET UP
SOME WORKING GROUPS THAT WOULD
SUPPORT PHASE I AND WORKING
GROUPS TO SUPPORT PHASE II.
BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT WITH THE
AGGRESSIVE TIMELINE, WE WILL
HAVE TO BEGIN IT THAT WORK
REALLY FAST.
JESSICA, MAYBE I'LL TURN IT BACK
TO YOU TO SEE WHAT YOUR THOUGHTS
ARE ON THE TWO WORKING GROUPS
AND HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED WITH
THOSE TWO WORKING GROUPS
INFORMING NEEDED TO SUPPORT
THESE TASKS.
>> SURE.
THANK YOU DR. PARKER.
YES, I AGREE WITH THAT, WITH
YOUR COMMENTS, I THINK.
GETTING THE FIRST PHASE WORKING
GROUP STARTED WORKING SOON WILL
BE REALLY IMPORTANT AND I HOPE
THE NSABB MEETING IN LATE
SEPTEMBER F WE FOLLOW THIS
TIMELINE, WOULD PROVIDE A GOOD
OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS THE DRAFT
FINDINGS FROM THE PHASE I
WORKING GROUP, WHICH WILL LIKELY
HAVE COMPLETED ITS CHARGE AT
THAT POINT AND THEN THE PHASE II
WORKING GROUP WILL LIKELY NOT
HAVE FINISHED IT'S WORK BUT THAT
SAME MEETING COULD SERVE AS AN
OPPORTUNITY TO GET FURTHER
FEEDBACK FROM THE COMMITTEE.
SO BACK TO YOU DR. PARKER.
>> NOW I'D LIKE TO OPEN IT UP TO
ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NSABB
TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS TO ME OR
THE NIH STAFF.
SOME OF THESE MAY BE MORE
APPROPRIATE FOR THE NIH STAFF
AND SOME OF THEM THAT I WILL BE
ABLE TO ADDRESS AS THE CHAIR OF
THE COMMITTEE.
SO JESSICA AND NIH STAFF WILL
HELP ME LOOK FOR THE RAISED HAND
IN THE ZOMBIEATURE SO WE CAN AT
LEAST -- ZOOM FEATURE SO WE CAN
HAVE ORDER TO ADDRESS QUESTIONS.
IF YOU HAVE A QUESTION, WHICH I
KNOW MANY OF YOU MUST HAVE SOME
QUESTIONS.
OR COMMENTS YOU'D LIKE TO MAKE,
NOW IS YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO --
IT'S YOUR TURN TO HEAR FROM YOU.
SO PLEASE USE THE RAISED HAND
FUNCTION IN ZOOM.
I SEE THAT DR. MAINAR HAS A
QUESTION OR COMMENT.
>> I'M SURE YOU'RE NOT
SURPRISED.
YES, THIS IS REALLY INTERESTING
AND I'M GLAD THAT THE OST.
AND NSC ARE INVOLVED HERE
BECAUSE MY BIG CONCERN IS THAT
WE CAN PUT TOGETHER A FABULOUS
INTERNALLY CONSISTENT AND OPEN
AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS FOR THE
UNITED STATES, BUT WE DON'T MAKE
RULES FOR EVERYBODY ELSE.
AND AS WE HAVE SEEN, CERTAINLY
IN WU HAN AND OTHER PLACES,
THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL TECHNICAL
CAPACITY TO DO EVERYTHING THAT
WE DO HERE.
WE ARE NOT SPECIAL ANYMORE IN
THAT REGARD.
SO WITH THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF
TECHNOLOGY, HOW DOES THIS GROUP
SEE THE APPLICATION OF THIS TO
THE INTERNATIONAL COMPONENTS?
IE, IF YOU CAN'T DO IT HERE IN
THE U.S. BECAUSE THE RULES ARE
TOO STRICT, WE'LL JUST MOVE TO
ANOTHER COUNTRY IT'S EASY.
IS THERE A GOT THE FACILITIES
AND THE PEOPLE.
I WANT TO KNOW WHERE THAT WOULD
POSSIBLY FIT INTO THIS
DISCUSSION.
>> I MIGHT -- THANK YOU.
I THINK IT'S A REALLY GOOD
COMMENT AND QUESTION.
AND I MIGHT FIRST MAYBE GO TO
OUR NIH COLLEAGUES OR OSTP, NSC
COLLEAGUES TO PROVIDE A U.S.
GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE.
I WAS GLAD TO SEE DR. TABAK'S
SLIDE THAT ONE OF OUR CHARGES IN
FACT, IS TO TRY TO UNPACK AND
UNDERSTAND SOME OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THIS AND HOW WE NEED TO BE
FORWARD -- WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT
FOR A LONG TIME, THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS AS
WELL.
SO DR. TABAK OR ANYBODY WANT TO
PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT?
>> IT IS CERTAINLY A CRITICALLY
IMPORTANT QUESTION AND ONE THAT
WE DON'T WANT TO IGNORE.
YOU'RE CORRECT.
THERE ARE CERTAIN LEVERS WE HAVE
AT OUR DISPOSAL AND THERE ARE
OTHERS THAT WE OBVIOUSLY MAY NOT
HAVE.
CERTAINLY, IN ANYTHING RELATED
TO -- WE ARE FUNDING BY THE
AGENCY, THE EXPECTATION IS FOR
PEOPLE TO ADHERE TO WHAT WE ARE
PUTTING INTO PLACE.
I DON'T KNOW IF YOU WANT TO ADD
ANYTHING TO THE COMMENT?
>> SURE.
THANK YOU, LARRY.
AS YOU NOTICED AND IT STATES IN
THE CHARGE THAT WE ARE ASKING
YOU TO EVALUATE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT
OVERSIGHT FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH
INVOLVING EPPs AND CONSIDERING
THAT RESEARCH INTERNATIONALLY.
THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE
OSTPP3CO POLICY GUIDANCE AND OUR
WHITE HOUSE COLLEAGUES CAN
DISCUSS MORE OF INTEREST RIGHT
NOW.
BUT WE ARE ENCOURAGING PARDON ME
NIDES COLLEAGUES TO SEEK
GUIDANCE IN FOLLOW-UP TO THE
RECOMMENDATIONS MADE PRIOR THAT
WE SHOULD BE ENGAGING AS A
NATION THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IN A DIALOGUE ABOUT
THE OVERSIGHT AND RESPONSIBLE
CONDUCT OF THIS TYPE OF WORK.
AS DR. TABAK MENTIONED, WE HAVE
SISTER STRICT RULES AND WE
CONSIDER THIS VERY IMPORTANT IN
TERMS OF WHAT WE FUND BUT THIS
INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION IS
REALLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE EVEN
FOR NATIONAL NORMS AND
EXPECTATIONS.
>> AND I'M HAPPY TO JUST ADD
THAT I THINK WE AGREE THAT
MITIGATING BIOLOGICAL RISKS
GLOBALLY IS A CRITICAL PRIORITY.
AND THAT IS WHY WE ARE LOOKING
AT BOTH DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL
SIDES.
OUR TOOLS AND LEVERS MAY DIFFER
ON BOTH SIDES BUT WE ARE
ABSOLUTELY LOOKING AT THE FULL
SPECTRUM.
>> I THINK, KEN BACK TO YOU AND
THE QUESTION.
I THINK THAT IS ONE OF THE
STRENGTHS OF THE NSABB THAT THIS
WILL BE ONE OF THE THINGS THAT
WE DISCUSS AND DELIBERATE AND
MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS.
AND I KNOW JUST MY OWN PERSONAL
EXPERIENCE, I SUPPORTED AN
OFFICE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
OVER THE LAST YEAR IN SOME
BIOSECURITY DIALOGUE MEETINGS
WITH THE G7 IN THE TOPIC HOW TO
HARMONIZE INTERNATIONAL
BIOMANAGEMENT RISKS AND
FRAMEWORKS?
SO THAT IS KIND OF PART OF THE
CONVERSATION.
BUT I THINK WE BRING A BREATH OF
EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE THAT
CAN MAKE SOME COMMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NIH AND
OSTP AND NSE THAT THEY CAN
CONSIDER IN THE POLICY
DELIBERATIONS THAT WILL ENSUE.
AND ANY OTHER QUESTIONS,
COMMENTS?
ON THE SCREEN I'M NOT SEEING ANY
HANDS BUT MAYBE I DON'T HAVE
EVERYBODY.
SO NIH -- MARK?
GO AHEAD I SEE YOUR HAND.
>> I COULDN'T FIND THE BUTTON.
HI TO DO ANALOGUE.
THANK YOU.
A COUPLE OF THINGS.
THE VERY FIRST SLIDE TALKED
ABOUT INTENTIONAL MISUSE OR
LAPSES OF BIOSAFETY, WHICH I
GUESS GAVE A -- TO ME THE SLIDE
WAS AN IMPLICATION THAT
INVESTIGATORS WILL FAIL AND MAKE
MISTAKES.
I POINT THAT OUT BECAUSE I THINK
ACCIDENTS CAN HAPPEN.
LAPSES IS AN IMPLICATION OF
FAILURE.
AND I WANT TO REALLY MAKE A
POINT AT THE VERY BEGINNING, I
THINK WAS PROBABLY THE LAST ONE
TO MAKE A COMMENT AT THE END OF
THE OTHER ONE, SAYING WHILE WE
ARE HERE DISCUSSING POTENTIAL,
WE ARE SEEING INCREASING NUMBER
OF CASES IN CHINA, WHICH LED US
TO SHUT DOWN -- I THINK MY
COMMENTS ARE ON RECORD THERE.
I WANT TO -- BECAUSE AS WE HAVE
BEEN LOOKING AT THE PANDEMIC AND
DOING RESEARCH FROM THAT AREA,
ON COUNTERMEASURES, I HAVE
ENCOUNTERED THE P3CO POLICY AS
BEING INADEQUATE, FOR EXAMPLE IT
EXCLUDES VACCINES AND
SURVEILLANCE BUT IT DOESN'T TALK
ABOUT OTHER MEASURES SUCH AS
ANTIVIRUS.
IMMUNE IMPLICATIONS FOR SELECT
AGENTS FOR ANY VIRULENCE
DETERMINANTS INTO SARS-COV-2
FROM SARS CoV WITHOUT A
DESCRIPTION WAS PUT IN PLACE
WITHOUT A TIME FOR PUBLIC
COMMENT BECAUSE IT WAS SO
IMPORTANT.
BUT IT WASN'T DEFINED WHAT THAT
MEANT.
AND THERE WAS -- SO THERE IS A
FEELING OF PRO SCRIPTIVE WITH A
LITTLE CASE ABOUT MAINTAINING
OUR CAPACITY FOR RESPONDING.
SO I WANT TO BE REALLY SURE THAT
AS WE DO THIS, THAT THAT WE ARE
REALLY EMPHASIZING THAT WE HAVE
JUST COMING THROUGH A
DEVASTATING PANDEMIC AND WE
DON'T UNDERSTAND THE BIOLOGY AND
THAT WE'RE REALLY TAKING TIME.
THE ONLY THING I'M CONCERNED
ABOUT, THIS IS MY COMMENT ABOUT
THE TIMEFRAME.
THAT WE HAVE TIME FOR SCIENTISTS
TO REALLY TALK ABOUT HOUR
SCIENCE IS PERFORMED AND HOW WE
REALLY WANT TO DO THIS RIGHT
WITHOUT PUTTING IN PLACE A PRO
SCRIPTIVE OR PRE SCRIPTIVE ANINE
MAKES IT NOT POSSIBLE TO CARRY
FORWARD THE WORK IN A TIMELY
MANNER.
>> THAT'S A VERY GOOD COMMENT.
AT THE END OF THE DAY, WE WANT
TO MAKE SURE THAT WE HAVE THE
ABILITY TO MAKE THOUGHTFUL
CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE TASK AT
HAND BUT WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT
THERE IS SOME URGENCY TOO.
THAT WE NEED TO MAKE SURE WE CAN
PROVIDE THE RIGHT ADVICE TO THE
INNER AGENCY.
THEY WILL BE STARTED POLICY
DELIBERATIONS AND WE WANT TO
MAKE SURE OUR VOICE AND
EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCES CAN
CONTRIBUTE TO THOSE POLICY
DELIBERATIONS THAT WILL TAKE
PLACE.
BUT IT IS A VERY, VERY IMPORTANT
THAT WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO
HAVE THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATIONS
AND TAKE THE RIGHT TIME.
AND THERE IS A LOT OF LESSONS
OBSERVED FROM SARS-COV-2 AND
COVID-19 THAT WE HAVE GOT TO
INCORPORATE TO TURN INTO LESSONS
LEARNED IN THIS EXERCISE.
OTHER QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS?
YES, PAMELA?
>> THANK YOU.
YES, I THINK THIS IS REALLY
TIMELY AND THANK YOU FOR
BRINGING UP THE INTERNATIONAL
COMPONENT BECAUSE I KNOW THAT
THERE IS A LOT OF INTEREST IN
HAVING SOME KIND OF AGREEMENTS
INTERNATIONAL.
I WANTED TO REVISIT SOMETHING I
REMEMBER FROM THE LAST MEETING,
AND MAYBE IT WAS NOT SUPER
IMPORTANT, BUT ONE OF THE THINGS
WE SPENT A LOT OF TIME ON AT
THAT MEETING, WHICH HAPPENED TO
BE MY FIRST MEETING, WAS HOW THE
DUAL-USE GRANTS HAD BEEN OKAYED
FOR FUNDING AND THERE WAS SOME
CONFUSION ABOUT THAT.
AND I THINK THAT WAS PART OF OUR
ONE OF OUR CHARGES.
AND I GUESS WE'RE -- GIVEN THAT
THINGS ARE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT,
WE ARE PUTTING THAT AWAY NOW.
I DON'T ACTUALLY WANT TO PURSUE
IT BUT I'M MAKING SURE THAT THAT
IS OFF THE TABLE.
ANYONE REMEMBER THAT?
>> I'LL TURN TO OUR NIH
COLLEAGUES.
>> I'M HAPPY TO ADDRESS THAT.
SO THE JANUARY 2020 MEETING WAS
FOCUSED ON THE BALANCE OF
TRANSPARENCY AND SECURITY WITH
REGARD TO SHARING INFORMATION
ABOUT RESEARCH INVOLVING
ENHANCED POTENTIAL PANDEMIC
PATHOGENS.
THAT IS STILL PART OF THE CHARGE
THAT IS GOING FORWARD FOR THIS
AMENDED CHARGE.
SO, THAT ASPECT THAT WE SPENT
TIME DISCUSSING IN JANUARY OF
2020 IS STILL PART OF THE CHARGE
MOVING FORWARD.
>> AND MAYBE IF I COULD --
JESSICA, KICKED IN MY MEMORY
TOO.
SO THE WAY TO THINK ABOUT IT, I
THINK, IS RATHER THAN THINKING
ABOUT INDIVIDUAL DRAFTS, IT'S
REALLY REVIEWING THE POLICIES
AND THE LESSONS OBSERVED AT THE
BIGGER PICTURE, NOT AT
INDIVIDUAL GRANTS.
THE QUESTIONS ARE STILL THERE
AND THEY WERE THERE THEN ABOUT
SOME SPECIFIC GRANTS BUT IT'S
STRANGE HOW EFFECTIVE POLICIES
AND WHAT CHANGES COULD BE MADE.
>> I THINK THIS IS A MUCH MORE
EFFECTIVE WAY TO GO ABOUT THAT.
BUT IT WILL STILL TRICKLE DOYNE
TO WHICH GLANCED GET FUNDED AND
WHICH DON'T, OR WHATEVER.
>> THAT'S WHY -- AS A FEDERAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, OUR JOB IS
NOT TO GET DOWN INTO ACTUAL
GRANT MANAGEMENT, IS THE WAY I
UNDERSTAND IT, ANYWAY.
BUT OUR JOB IS TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS THAT COULD
ENABLE AND HELP THE NIH AND
OTHER DEPARTMENT AGENCIES HAVE
THE RIGHT FRAMEWORK TO ASSIST
THEM IN GRANT MANAGEMENT.
KEN, IS THAT HOW IT WORKS?
I SEE YOUR HAND UP AGAIN.
>> YES.
JUST WANT TO SUPPORT MARK'S
COMMENTS HERE.
THERE IS A BIG ISSUE HERE THAT
PEOPLE TOUCH ON FREQUENTLY ON
THIS AND THAT IS, WE HAVE TO
MAKE SURE THE RULES THAT WE
RECOMMEND DON'T ACTUALLY INHIBIT
RESEARCH.
AS I WAS SAYING EARLIER, SUCH
THAT WE ARE THE ONLY PLACE WHERE
YOU DON'T WANT TO WORK ON AGENTS
THAT ACTUALLY ARE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH CONCERN.
AND I THINK THAT IS A REAL RISK.
ALTERNATIVELY AND AGAINST THAT
IS THE PUSHBACK THAT WE GOT FOR
YEARS ON CONTROLLING RESEARCH AT
THE LOCAL LEVEL AND IT'S JUST
TOO HARD FOR US TO DO.
WE CAN'T FIGURE OUT WHAT IS
IMPORTANT AND WHAT ISN'T
IMPORTANT, WHAT IS DANGEROUS AND
WHAT ISN'T DANGEROUS.
AND IN SOME RESPECTS,
RESEARCHERS USE THAT AS A REASON
TO PUSH BACK ON ANY KIND OF
CONTROL OF RESEARCH FOR OBVIOUS
REASONS, IN THEIR INTEREST IN
THE RESEARCH ITSELF AND SELF
INTERESTS.
NONETHELESS, I CAN'T EMPHASIZE
TOO MUCH IN MY OPINION, HOW
IMPORTANT IT IS TO NOT BE THE
ONLY PLACE IN THE WORLD WHERE
RESEARCH IS TOO HARD TO DO.
AND THERE IS TOO MANY RULES, TOO
MANY REGULATIONS AND GIVEN THE
FACT THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT ONLY
REALLY CAN CONTROL HOW IT FUNDS
U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDED RESEARCH,
MUCH OF THE RESEARCH AROUND THE
WORLD IS DONE IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR AND IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
WE REALLY WANT TO MAKE SURE WE
DON'T PUT OURSELVES AT A
COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE IN ALL
OF THIS.
AND I'M A NATIONAL SECURITY GUY.
I MEAN, I'M THE KIND OF GUY THAT
IS ALWAYS LOOKING FOR HOW
SOMEBODY IS GOING TO USE
SOMETHING TO HURT US.
SO BUT I JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE
THAT WE DON'T GET INTO AN ODD
SITUATION WHERE WE HAVE TO GO TO
ANOTHER COUNTRY IN ORDER TO FIND
OUT INFORMATION ABOUT PROBLEMS,
SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO THE
UNITED STATES.
>> AND MAYBE CAN I JUMP IN HERE
REALLY QUICK, DR. PARKER?
SO, DR. BERNARD, YOU ASKED A
REALLY FANTASTIC QUESTION.
I WAS THINKING ABOUT IT FROM THE
MINUTE YOU ASKED AND IT AND I
DIDN'T WEIGH IN EARLIER.
BUT I THINK REALLY WHAT YOU'RE
GETTING AT IS WE THOUGHT ABOUT
BALANCING SCIENCE AND SECURITY.
WE HAVE APPROACHED THIS TOPIC IN
THE PAST BUT NOW A NEW LAYER OF
COMPETITIVENESS AND THINKING IN
A GLOBAL CONTEXT HOW TO BALANCE
SCIENCE AND SECURITY WHILE STILL
MAINTAINING COMPETITIVENESS.
I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE ANSWER IS.
I THINK IT'S A GREAT QUESTION
BUT THERE ARE OTHER EXAMPLES
THAT MATED SERVICE AS
INSTRUCTIVE MODELS FOR HOW WE
THINK ABOUT IT HERE AND THE
MODEL THAT I'M IMMEDIATELY DRAWN
TO IS JUST HOW WE APPROACHED
GLOBAL NORM SETTING FOR NEW
BIOTECHNOLOGIES LIKE CHRIS PER
GENOME EDITING.
-- CRISPR -- SO ANYTHING THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES IN THIS
REALM MUST BE COMPLIMENTED BY A
GLOBAL PROCESS TO DEVELOP,
DISSEM FLATE, PROMULGATE, THE
NORMS THAT WILL ENSURE
APPROPRIATE CONDUCT.
WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO HOW
YOU ALL APPROACH THIS, THE IDEAS
THAT EMERGE FROM YOUR
DISCUSSIONS AND LOOK FORWARD TO
FINDING WAYS FOR THOSE TO INFORM
HOW WE ARE APPROACHING THIS BOTH
DOMESTICALLY AND
INTERNATIONALLY.
>> AND I'D LIKE TO JUST --
>> FIRST TO DR.-- THIS IS WHY
SOME OF THIS, THE FIRST PHASE OF
THIS TASK IS SO IMPORTANT TO
THINK ABOUT THE SCOPE AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEFINITIONS
WE ARE USING.
AGAIN THESE ARE THE RULES THAT
HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY PRIOR
NSABB RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEFORE
WE THINK ABOUT HOW TO MOVE
FORWARD, LOOKING AT WHETHER OR
NOT THAT THE SCOPE IS THE
APPROPRIATE ONE TO CONTINUE
FORWARD.
AND THEN BUILDING PATHS AND
THINKING THROUGH THAT.
SO THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
>> AND I'D LIKE TO ADD TO ALL OF
THAT.
AT THE END OF THE DAY, WE HAVE
TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR RESEARCH
ENTERPRISE IS DONE IN A SAFE,
SECURE RESPONSIBLE WAY BUT WE
ARE ALSO IN THE RACE FOR THE
BIOECONOMY.
THIS IS ALL A REAL DELICATE
BALANCE THAT WE HAVE GOT TO FIND
THE RIGHT WAY FORWARD.
RACHEL.
>> YES, HI.
THANK YOU.
AND JUST TO SAY, WELCOME TO THE
GROUP.
THIS IS MY FIRST MEETING.
AND IT COMES AS SUCH AN
OPPORTUNE TIME BECAUSE I THINK
THAT IN MANY WAYS THE
PANDEMIC -- I KEEP LOOKING FOR
SILVER LININGS IN THE PANDEMIC.
BUT OUR BASELINE THOUGHTS ABOUT
RISK, LEVEL OF RISK AND
PARTICULARLY RISK OF NOT DOING
RESEARCH OR IMPEDING RISK
RESEARCH THAT WE CAN SEE THE
VALUE OF NOW, AFFORDS US THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PERHAPS LOOK AT
THIS SET OF POLICIES IN A
DIFFERENT WAY OR A SLIGHTLY
DIFFERENT WAY WITH DIFFERENT
WEIGHTS THAN WE MAY HAVE DONE IN
THE PAST.
AND THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE
INTERNATIONAL ELEMENTS OF THIS,
I THINK ARE REALLY CRITICAL.
WE HAVE SEEN EXAMPLES NOT JUST
OF RESEARCH WE VALUE WHEN WE
LOOK AT IN OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT
EVEN BEFORE THE PANDEMIC, THERE
WERE EXAMPLES OF DIFFICULTIES IN
GETTING PARTICULAR REAGENTS OR
TOXINS THAT YOU COULD NOT GET IN
THE UNITED STATES BUT YOU COULD
BUY THEM FROM OTHER COUNTRY.
AND STILL DO THE RESEARCH HERE
BUT THERE ARE THOSE ISSUES THAT
CAME UP AND EXAMPLES THAT WE SAW
OF PEOPLE WHO WERE WILLING TO
MOVE THEIR LAB TO ANOTHER
COUNTRY BECAUSE IT WAS JUST TOO
DIFFICULT.
OR THE HIDDEN IMPEDIMENTS OF
STUDENTS, GRAD STUDENTS,
POSTDOCS, WHO DON'T WANT TO BE
INTO AREAS OF RESEARCH THAT WE
FEEL WOULD BE VERY VALUABLE
BECAUSE IT'S TOO DIFFICULT AND
THEY WERE ADVISED AGAINST IT.
SO I THINK THAT THAT THERE ARE A
NUMBER OF CONCERNS THAT --
SORRY.
THAT WE NEED TO PAY ATTENTION
TO.
AND I THINK I HAD SOME OTHER
ISSUES TOO BUT I THINK THAT IS
ENOUGH FOR MY FIRST COMMENT.
>> THANK YOU, RACHEL AND WELCOME
TO THE BOARD.
WELL, WE ARE BEGINNING TO --
>> THERE IS A COMMENT BY
DR. HAINES.
>> GO AHEAD.
>> HI, HELLO, EVERYONE AND JUST
QUICKLY, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR
THE THIS OPPORTUNITY.
I'M REALLY EXCITED TO JOIN THE
BOARD.
I DID WANT TO MAYBE COMMENT OR
ASK.
I'M CURIOUS ABOUT WHETHER IT'S
WITHIN OUR SCOPE TO ALSO
CONSIDER RELATIONSHIPS WITH SORT
OF LIKE THE NON-PROFESSIONAL
SCIENCE PUBLIC, WITH THE
COMMUNITY?
JUST THE TRUST BETWEEN THE
SCIENTISTS AND THE EXPERTS
ESPECIALLY AROUND THE TOPIC OF
COVID.
IT'S JUST REALLY -- IT'S BEEN
DISTURBING.
I THINK IT'S IMPEDED A LOT OF
THINGS.
I MEAN A LOT OF THE ROAD BLOCKS
AND SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTING
PUBLIC POLICY AROUND TRYING TO
STOP THE SPREAD HAD BEEN BASED
ON A LACK OF TRUST.
THIS BROKEN TRUST BETWEEN THE
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AND
EVERYONE WHO IS NOT NECESSARILY
PROFESSIONAL SCIENTISTS.
SO I GUESS I WANTED TO MAKE THAT
COMMENT AND I'M ALSO CURIOUS
ABOUT WHETHER THAT IS SORT OF
PART OF WHAT THIS BOARD WOULD
ADDRESS.
>> THANK YOU.
AND I'LL START AND I KNOW NIH
COLLEAGUES MAY WANT TO HAVE
COMMENTED.
I THINK THAT'S A REAL IMPORTANT
POINT.
WE HAVE TO -- OUR DELIBERATIONS
NEED TO BE INFORMED BY THE
PUBLIC AT LARGE AND THEY, THE
PUBLIC HAS A STAKE IN THE WORK
OF WHAT WE WILL BE DOING AND
WHAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WILL BE DOING.
AND I KNOW THAT WE SAW IN THE
SLIDE TIMELINE THAT THE NIH WILL
SCHEDULE SOME LISTENING SESSIONS
AND THOSE LISTENING SESSIONS, I
BELIEVE, ARE DESIGNED
SPECIFICALLY TO MAKE SURE THAT
WE HAVE BROADER INPUT TO INCLUDE
THE PUBLIC AND TO MAKE SURE THE
PUBLIC CONCERNS ARE BUILT INTO
OUR DELIBERATIONS.
SO WE WILL HAVE TO PAY
ATTENTION.
THEY MAY NOT BE SPECIFIC BOARDS
BUT WE NEED TO PAY ATTENTION TO
THOSE LISTENING SESSIONS AND
TAKE THAT INPUT INTO OUR
DELIBERATIONS.
IT'S AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT, I
BELIEVE, OF OUR WORK.
SO I DON'T KNOW, JESSICA OR
ANYBODY ELSE FROM THE NIH STAFF
WANT TO COMMENT?
AND WE ARE REACHING TIME -- END
TIME SO WE WILL HAVE TO WRAP UP
PRETTY QUICK.
>> I WOULD.
FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, I THINK
WHAT YOU SAID IS EXACTLY RIGHT.
OBVIOUSLY THAT IS CRITICALLY
IMPORTANT AND HOPEFULLY THE WAY
THAT THE CHARGE HAS BEEN
STRUCTURED WILL WOWASM
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT
WITH DIFFERENT GROUPS OUTSIDE OF
JUST THE SCIENCE COMMUNITY.
>> I SEE AT LEAST MAYBE TWO
OTHER QUESTIONS.
CAN WE AT LEAST GET COMMENTS OR
QUESTIONS IN EVEN THOUGH WE MAY
NOT BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THEM.
>> I THINK THAT WILL BE FINE.
>> JACKLYN, I SEE YOUR HAND UP
AND I THOUGHT I SAW ALEX'S HAND
UP A MINUTE AGO.
>> THANK YOU.
I REMEMBER THAT IN OUR MEETING
TWO YEARS AGO WE TALKED ABOUT
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
APPLICATION OF THESE POLICIES
AND PRINCIPLES TO ALL
BIOTHREATS, INCLUDING NOT JUST
THE HUMAN SIDE BUT THE ANIMAL,
THE AGRICULTURAL SIDE WITH
LIVESTOCK AND CROP ISSUES.
SINCE THEN, WE HAVE HAD SUCH A
WHIPLASH OF ATTENTION GOING INTO
COVID.
AND RIGHTLY SO, OF COURSE.
I'M JUST WONDERING IF THE
PERCEPTION OF OUR CHARGE IS
SLIGHTLY ADJUSTED BASED ON THAT
AND IF WE STILL WANT THAT THE
TIME, TO INCLUDE THE
AGRICULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THIS?
>> I DID -- IN THE
PRESENTATIONS, I DID IN
PARTICULAR WITH DURC, IT
INCLUDED HUMANS, AGRICULTURAL
AND ENVIRONMENTAL, AB MALL,
PLANTS -- ANIMAL -- MY
PERSPECTIVE IS YES, WE CAN GET
OTHER GUIDANCE FROM OUR NIH
COLLEAGUES ON THAT.
BUT THAT'S SOMETHING WE DON'T
HAVE TO ANSWER RIGHT NOW.
BUT OUR DELIBERATIONS AND INPUT
ARE IN THAT.
ALEX?
>> THANK YOU.
THIS IS MY FIRST MEETING AND I
WANTED TO WEIGH IN ON THIS ISSUE
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS.
AND IN PARTICULAR, I THINK IT'S
VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE
SUCKSATIVE RULES THAT WE
ARTICULATE PROVIDE CREDIBLE
ASSURANCE TO THE PUBLIC THAT THE
RESEARCH THAT WE DO PERMIT HAS
SUFFICIENT SOCIAL VALUE THAT THE
RISKS THAT ARE ENTAILED FROM IT
ARE WORTH TAKING.
AND THEN I THINK WE NEED TO RELY
ON OUR DIPLOMATIC AND POLICY
COLLEAGUES TO MAKE SURE THAT
THEIR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS ARE
MADE TO ENSURE THAT FLOOR IS
UNDERNEATH THOSE POLICY
GUIDELINES.
AND WE WANT TO AVOID THE RISK TO
RACE TO THE BOTTOM BECAUSE OTHER
PEOPLE HAVE WEAKER POLICY
ENVIRONMENT WHERE RISKS CAN BE
TAKEN EVEN IF THEY DON'T
ADEQUATELY OFFSET THE
POTENTIAL -- THEY DON'T HAVE
ADEQUATE SOCIAL VALUE TO JUSTIFY
THEM.
>> VERY IMPORTANT COMMENT AND
ADVICE WE NEED TO ADHERE TO.
I'M NOT SEEING ANY OTHER HANDS
RAISED.
SO, IF THAT'S THE CASE, JESSICA,
I THINK IT'S PROBABLY TIME THAT
WE NEED TO GO AHEAD AND WRAP UP.
CORRECT?
SO I WANT TO FIRST THANK
EVERYBODY FOR THE THOUGHTFUL
DISCUSSIONS.
FIRST I WANT TO THANK FOR THE
BRIEFINGS FROM THE NIH AND THE
OSTP AND NSE LEADERSHIP.
THAT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR US
TO SEE THAT THESE ISSUES ARE
BEING TAKEN VERY, VERY SERIOUSLY
AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF OUR
GOVERNMENT AND THEY ARE ASKING
US SOME PRETTY IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS AND HAVE GIVEN US A
PRETTY SERIOUS CHARGE THAT WILL
ONE, NEED THOUGHTFUL
CONSIDERATION AND ALSO SOME
URGENT ACTION.
SO WITH THAT, I LOOK FORWARD AND
I'M HONORED TO WORK WITH
EVERYBODYO THIS COMMITTEE AND
YOUR EXPERTISE IS REALLY
UNBELIEVABLE AND EXTRAORDINARY.
I'M HONORED TO BE ABLE TO BE A
PART OF IT AND WORK WITH YOU AS
WE START THIS JOURNEY TO REALLY
KIND OF ADDRESS SOME VERY, VERY
CRITICAL QUESTIONS FOR THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY.
SO I THINK PROBABLY THE NEXT
STEPS IS THE NIH WILL BE
REACHING OUT.
ONE, TO WHICH WORKING GROUP YOU
WOULD LIKE TO BE A PART OF AND
IT'S OKAY IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO
BE ON BOTH WORKING GROUPS,
THAT'S OKAY TOO.
BUT I KNOW THE NIH IS GOING TO
NEED TO LOOK AND MAKE SURE THAT
WE HAVE BALANCE ACROSS THE
WORKING GROUPS.
WE NEED TO HAVE AT LEAST SOME
PRETTY BROAD AND EQUAL
REPRESENTATION ON THE WORKING
GROUPS.
JUST KNOWING THE EXPERIENCE AND
EXPERTISE OF THIS COMMITTEE, ALL
OF US CAN CONTRIBUTE TO
EITHER-OR BOTH.
SO I'M NOT TOO WORRIED ABOUT
THAT.
WE ARE ALSO GOING TO BE NEEDING
TO ASK FOR VOLUNTEERS WHO MAY
WANT TO CHAIR OR CO-CHAIR THE
WORKING GROUP AND THAT WILL BE
SEEING WHOA WANTS TO PARTICIPATE
IN EACH WORKING GROUP OR BOTH,
BUT OF COURSE THEY WILL NEED TO
AGREE THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO BE
A CHAIR OR CO-CHAIR.
THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE TIME
COMMITMENT TO THIS.
INK THE ANTICIPATION IS THAT
WORKING GROUPS MAY BE MEETING
TWICE A MONTH.
ONE OR TWO HOURS EACH MEETING.
AND THERE WILL BE READING
MATERIAL AND PREP BEFORE THE
MEETINGS.
AT LEAST THAT'S THE WORKING
HYPOTHESIS AS WE MOVE INTO THE
ACTUAL WORK.
SO WITH THAT, JESSICA, AM I
FORGETTING SOMETHING AS FAR AS
SOME OF THE MECHANISMS OF HOW WE
MOVE FORWARD?
>> NO, THAT IS RIGHT.
ESSENTIALLY WE'LL REACH OUT TO
YOU TO SEEK VOLUNTEERS AND AS
DR. PARKER SAID, DEPENDING ON
HOW THAT GOES, WE'LL WORK WITH
YOU ALL TO IDENTIFY CHAIRS FOR
THE WORKING GROUPS.
SO THAT PROVIDES A GOOD OUTLINE
THE PROCESS.
SO THANK YOU.
THANK YOU FOR THAT.
DR. PARKER.
>> BEFORE I ADJOURN, ONE OF THE
THINGS, PARTICULARLY FOR NEW
MEMBERS, IF YOU'RE NOT FAMILIAR
WITH THE HISTORY OF THE NSABB
AND ITS PRIOR RECOMMENDATIONS,
IT'S WORTHWHILE TO GO BACK AND
LOOK AT THE HISTORY OF WHY AND
HOW THE NSABB WAS FORMED AND THE
INITIAL CHARGE AND THE
RECOMMENDATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN
MADE SINCE ITS BEGINNING.
THAT IS VERY HELPFUL TO
UNDERSTAND HOW THE POLICIES HAVE
EVOLVED REALLY SINCE THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY'S BIOTECHNOLOGY
AND AGE OF TERRORISM REPORT,
THAT KIND OF REALLY WAS THE
FIRST REAL CRITICAL THOUGHT OF
HOW WE NEED TO CONSIDER DOING
THIS RESEARCH AND
GAIN-OF-FUNCTION RESEARCH.
SO IT'S VALUABLE TO GO BACK AND
LOOK THAT THE HISTORY AND
EVOLUTION AND THAT GIVES YOU
CONTEXT OF WHERE WE ARE AT RIGHT
NOW.
AND THE THINGS WE NEED TO DO
GOING FORWARD.
SO WITH THAT, I WILL ADJOURN THE
MEETING.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH.